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THE SUPREME COURT GIVES STATES A FREE
REIN WITH SODOMY STATUTES: BOWERS
v. HARDWICK
Courts have often struggled with the question of whether the consti-
tutional right to privacy' extends to a homosexual's intimate activity.2
I. The Constitution does not explicitly provide a right of privacy. D. O'BRIEN,
PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1979). A constitutional right of privacy
emerged instead through judicial interpretation of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 178. In 1965, the United States Supreme Court recognized a right of
privacy as a fundamental personal right emanating from the Constitution. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Griswold. Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion, maintained that judi-
cial recognition of a right of privacy is permissible because the Constitution extends
protection to an individual's privacy interest through "penumbras" or "shadows" of
express guarantees. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. See O'BRIEN, supra, at 177-99 (discus-
sion of privacy as a fundamental right). Because the Court regards these fundamental
constitutional rights as penumbral, it generally protects such rights from governmental
intrusion. Id. at 3. Douglas further asserted that the privacy rights embodied in the
penumbras are peripheral rights that give life and substance to the guaranteed rights.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. See generally BAurETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1973).
The Supreme Court has found fundamental rights in the areas relating to marriage,
childbearing and family life. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Constitution prevents states from interfering in woman's
decision of whether to bear a child); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (right of privacy protects decisions regarding family); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Constitution protects privacy of marital relationships). Most of
the interests that the Court has found to be fundamental fall within the broad category
of the right of privacy. BARNETT, supra, at 52-73. When the Court determines that a
right is fundamental, it applies a test of strict scrutiny to the statutes in question. This
test requires that the state show a compelling interest that cannot be furthered in a less
burdensome way. O'BRIEN, supra, at 189. This two part test is so strict that few stat-
utes are able to survive judicial scrutiny. Id.
The Court and other scholars make four assumptions about the concept of privacy:
1. Privacy denotes the seclusion or withdrawal of an individual from public
affairs.
2. Privacy is voluntary; it is therefore, basically an aspect of individual freedom
and control over personal engagements.
3. Privacy is equated with a right.
4. Privacy is valued for either its intrinsic worth or its instrumental value, but
rarely are both of these values considered simultaneously.
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Many states attempt to control this activity by enacting sodomy 3 stat-
utes that criminalize adult sodomitic activity.4 In Bowers v. Hardwick I
the United States Supreme Court held that state statutes prohibiting
adult sodomitic activity were valid because the Constitution does not
Id. at 4. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 501-16 (1 1th ed. 1985)
(discussion of right of privacy).
2. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986) (Georgia sodomy statute declared unconstitutional); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986) (Court upheld sodomy statute
exclusive to homosexuals); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pri-
vate homosexual activity is not protected by the Constitution); Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Court held
sodomy statute constitutional). See generally Comment, A Setback For the Right of
Privacy, 65 Ky. L.J. 748, 755-62 (1976-77) (critical discussion of Doe and how it devi-
ates from line of Supreme Court decisions) [hereinafter Comment, Setback]; Comment,
Marriage, Kinship and the Purposes of a Democratic Society, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463, 517
(1983) (discussion of the evolution of right to privacy protection) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Marriage].
3. Sodomy is defined as oral or anal copulation between persons who are not hus-
band and wife, or consenting adult members of the opposite sex. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1247 (5th ed. 1979). See also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 568 (2d
ed. 1979) (sodomy defined as any sexual intercourse considered abnormal, as between
two male persons). See generally Comment, Constitutional Protection of Private Sexual
Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62 IowA L. REV.
568, 568 (1976) (definition of sodomy and discussion of the expansion of homosexuals'
rights in light of Supreme Court decisions) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional Pro-
tection].
While most sodomy statutes apply equally to both heterosexuals and homosexuals,
primarily the latter suffer arrest and conviction for participating in activities proscribed
by these statutes. Comment, Setback; supra note 2, at 478.
4. Statutes in twenty-five states make private homosexual behavior between con-
senting adults subject to criminal sanction. Comment, Setback, supra note 2, at 750.
See generally Comment, The Right to Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to
Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 811, 811-875 (1984) (objective discussion of the
constitutionality of sodomy statutes).
For years, federal and state courts disagreed over the issue of whether state sodomy
statutes are constitutional. See infra notes 40-47 (discussing Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney; sodomy statute constitutional); infra notes 48-52 (discussing Baker v. Wade;
sodomy statute valid); infra note 5 (discussing Hardwick v. Bowers; sodomy statute
unconstitutional).
5. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). In Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1Ith Cir. 1985),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia sodomy
statute infringed upon a homosexual's fundamental right to engage in private, consen-
sual sexual activity. 760 F.2d at 1213. The Eleventh Circuit further held that such
statutes are valid only if a state shows a compelling interest and proves that the regula-
tion is narrowly tailored to further that interest. Id. See infra note 8 for the text of the
Georgia sodomy statute.
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confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.6
In Bowers the plaintiff was a practicing homosexual who regularly
engaged in private homosexual activity.7 He was charged with violat-
ing a Georgia sodomy statute' when he sodomized with a consenting
adult male in his own home.' Hardwick challenged the constitutional-
ity of the statute,1° claiming that it violated an individual's constitu-
6. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
7. Id. at 2842.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984), reads, in part, as follows:
a. A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another ....
b. A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
Id.
9. 106 S. Ct. at 2842. The District Attorney brought charges against Hardwick as a
result of his arrest, and after a hearing in the Municipal Court of Atlanta, Hardwick
was bound over to the Superior Court. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th
Cir. 1985). The district attorney decided not to present the case to the jury unless
further evidence developed. Id
10. The lower courts decided two peripheral issues regarding the parties' standing
to bring suit. The first issue involved a married couple, John and Mary Doe, who at-
tempted to join Hardwick in his suit. 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2. The Does alleged that they
desired to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but had been "chilled and
deterred" by the existence of the statute and the recent arrest of Hardwick. Id. The
district court dismissed Doe's claim, holding that they lacked standing. Id. The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered an
actual or threatened injury caused by the challenged conduct of the defendant. 760
F.2d at 1206-07. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabon County Chamber of
Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs had standing to bring suit to
request the dismantling of a lighted cross in state park because they had been injured
due to their unwillingness to camp in the part because of the cross). Because the Does
had not been arrested for the activity proscribed by the statute, the appellate court held
that the Does could not rely solely on Hardwick's past arrest to give them standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute. 760 F.2d at 1205. Because the Does suf-
fered no threat of prosecution and presented no evidence to support that contention, the
court dismissed their claim. Id. at 1207.
The second peripheral issue that the court of appeals discussed involved Hardwick's
standing. Id. at 1204. Because Hardwick brought an anticipatory challenge to the stat-
ute, the court asserted that Hardwick's standing depended upon whether the threat of
prosecution under the statute was real and immediate or "imaginary" and "specula-
tive." Id. at 1205. The court relied on two factors to find that Hardwick had standing
to bring the suit. The first factor was that the police had previously arrested Hardwick
for violating the statute. Id. The court argued that the past enforcement of the statute
against Hardwick was significant in measuring the state's intentions of prosecuting him
in the future. Id. The second factor was that Hardwick desired to engage in the prohib-
ited conduct regardless of its legal status. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held, therefore, that
19871
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tional right to privacy by prohibiting him from engaging in deviate
sexual behavior11 in the privacy of his home.1" The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial.1 The Elev-
enth Circuit held that the Georgia sodomy statute unconstitutionally
impinged upon a fundamental right of homosexuals. The court noted
that the statute was void unless the state could prove a compelling in-
terest and narrowly tailor the statute to advance that interest.1 4 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit decision
and held that the Georgia statute was constitutional because the Con-
stitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy.' 5
The Constitution does not explicitly grant a right of privacy. 6
Through a series of landmark decisions, however, the Supreme Court
recognized a right of privacy as implicit in the fourteenth amend-
ment. 7 In Griswold v. Connecticut" the Supreme Court first recog-
nized the right of privacy as an independent constitutional right.'9 The
Court invalidated a birth control statute that prohibited the use of con-
traceptives.20 The Court held that an individual's right to make deci-
Hardwick faced a real threat of prosecution that gave him standing to bring the suit.
Id. at 1206.
11. Deviate sexual intercourse is any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person, and the mouth or anus of another person. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986). See infra notes 48-52 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of Baker).
12. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The court of appeals ruled that Hardwick had no legal claim
because of precedent set in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), a prior Supreme Court case. In Doe the
district court upheld the constitutionality of a state sodomy statute. See infra notes 44-
53 and accompanying text.
13. 760 F.2d 1202, 1213 (1lth Cir. 1985).
14. Id.
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
16. See supra note 1.
17. See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text (discussion of cases that recognize
a right to privacy). See generally 15 DuQ. L. REv. 123 (1976) (critical discussion of
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney).
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A Connecticut court convicted two directors of Planned
Parenthood of violating the state contraceptive statute for giving information, instruc-
tion, and medical advice to married persons for the purpose of preventing conception.
Id. at 480.
19. Id. at 485.
20. Id.
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sions peculiar to the marital relationship is a fundamental right21
because it involves intimate and personal matters that should not be
subject to state interference.22 As a result, states could not justify stat-
utes infringing on the right of privacy by a mere showing of a rational
basis.23 States now have to show a compelling interest and demon-
strate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to further that interest
before they can regulate activity involving marriage.24
Six years later, the Supreme Court expanded the bounds of the right
to privacy protection to include relations outside marriage. In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird25 the Supreme Court extended the Griswold holding to
strike down a state statute that forbade the distribution of contracep-
tives to single individuals.26 The Court held that the right of privacy in
personal matters should no longer be limited to the marital relation-
ship.27 Essential to this holding was the Court's assertion that the indi-
vidual, married or single, should be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusions into highly personal matters.28
21. See supra note I (discussion of fundamental right).
22. 381 U.S. at 485. See generally Comment, Setback, supra note 2, at 755.
23. 381 U.S. at 485. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 177-199 (discussion of
Court's shift from rational basis test to compelling interest test for fundamental rights of
privacy).
24. 381 U.S. at 485. See, e-g., Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(state cannot prevent the sale of non-prescription contraceptives to adults by persons
other than licensed pharmacists because no compelling state interest exists); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (decisions respecting marriage, including an individual's
right to get married, are among protected liberties).
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt the defendant gave a lecture on contracep-
tives to a group of college students, and gave one student a package of contraceptives at
the end of his speech. Id. at 440. See Comment, Setback supra note 2, at 757 (discus-
sion of Supreme Court's expansion of right of privacy to decisions outside the marital
relationship).
26. 405 U.S. at 453.
27. Id. But see Louisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Louisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (court suggested that the right of privacy is
probably confined to the marital relationship); State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d
1352 (1976) (court held state sodomy statute constitutional and found that the right of
privacy does not extend to unmarried people).
28. 405 U.S. at 453. The Court stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." Id. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, B.Y.U.L. REv. 170, 176-80 (1977) (discussion of Doe,
and similar sodomy statutes).
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Similarly, in Roe v. Wade2 9 the Supreme Court extended the consti-
tutional right of privacy to include decisions outside the context of
marriage.30 In Roe the Court invalidated an anti-abortion statute,
holding that because the decision to terminate pregnancy is a personal
matter of grave importance in the life of the decisionmaker, the Consti-
tution protects such a decision under the fourteenth amendment.3" As
a result of Eisenstadt and Roe, the Supreme Court redefined the consti-
tutional protection of the right of privacy to encompass the rights of all
individuals to make certain personal decisions, regardless of their mari-
tal status.
32
In Stanley v. Georgia33 the Supreme Court extended the right of pri-
vacy in a different manner. Rather than evaluating this case exclu-
sively by the classification of individuals to determine if a right of
privacy existed,34 the Court shifted its focus to the locality of the pro-
hibited activity3 5 and expanded the right of privacy protection to in-
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe a pregnant single woman brought a class action
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion statute that made it a
crime to obtain or perform an abortion. Id. at 120. The plaintiff desired to terminate
her pregnancy by having a licensed physician perform an abortion. Id. The plaintiff
alleged that she was unable to obtain an abortion because of the Texas statute. Id. She
claimed that the statute abridged her right of privacy as protected by the first, fourth,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Id.
30. 410 U.S. at 120. Although the Court restricted its holding to decisions regard-
ing childbearing, the Roe decision had a much wider impact on subsequent right of
privacy cases. See generally Comment, Marriage, supra note 2, at 520, 526, 532.
31. 410 U.S. at 153.
32. Comment, Setback, supra note 2, at 757.
33. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley police officers executing a valid search warrant
found obscene films in Stanley's home. Id. at 558. He was charged with possession of
obscene material. Id. at 559.
34. Before Stanley the Court's main focus was on specific classes of individuals.
See, e-g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Court extended privacy protection to
class consisting of unmarried adults); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(Court extended privacy protection to class consisting of married adults). See supra
notes 18-24 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these cases.
35. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Stanley explained the shift in focus, em-
phasizing the inherent privacy of activities in individuals' homes. 394 U.S. at 565.
Marshall reasoned that because the state attempted to regulate what individuals read,
the Court needed to change its focus to both the location of Stanley's activities and the
nature and purpose of the intrusion. Id.
The Supreme Court continued to focus on locality in subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (Court rejected privacy claims ex-
tended to adult theaters); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (Court rejected
privacy claims to sell obscene materials in marketplace).
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elude intimate activities in the home.36 The Court invalidated a statute
that prohibited the possession of obscene matter in the home.37 Ac-
cording to the Court, a state cannot reach into the privacy of one's
home and control the moral content of a person's thoughts.38 The
Court recognized the state interest in regulating obscenity, but found
that this interest was not compelling enough to justify an invasion into
an individual's home.39
In 1975, the Supreme Court made an unprecedented departure from
the developing line of case law regarding the right of privacy. This
departure marked another change in the focus of the Court's analysis.
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney' the Court focused on the activity
of the individual challenging the statute, disregarding the classification
of persons41 and the locality of the activity as bases for a right of pri-
vacy decision.42 In Doe the district court upheld a sodomy statute that
prohibited individuals from engaging in sodomitic activity.43 The
Court found that the right of privacy concerned issues relating only to
marriage, childbearing, and family life, which placed private homosex-
ual activity outside the scope of protection.' The Court further rea-
soned that the statute was a proper exercise of the state's police
power,45 therefore justifying the criminalization of such activity.46 The
36. Id. at 565. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (police prohibited
from making warrantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home to make routine
felony arrest because the entry constituted invasion of privacy of home).
37. 394 U.S. at 558.
38. Id. at 565.
39. Id. at 568.
40. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The plaintiffs
were adults seeking court protection from the effects of a sodomy statute in order to
engage in private homosexual relations. Id. at 1205. See generally Comment, Setback,
supra note 2, at 748 (discussion of Doe controversy and its precedential effect).
41. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 18-24 and
accompanying text (discussion of Griswold).
42. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See supra notes 33-39 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Stanley).
43. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
44. Id. at 1203. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which
the Court refused to protect private, consensual, homosexual conduct because constitu-
tional recognition of the right of privacy has never been defined by the Court to encom-
pass homosexual conduct.
45. The analysis of a state's police powers involves both the question of whether the
power exists in a particular case and can be exercised, and whether the state has used it
properly. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298-305, 298 (2d ed. 1969). When
these two questions face the Court, it must consider the purpose of the legislation as
1987]
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Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's holding.4 7
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas sodomy
well. Id. The state's police power is justifiably utilized only if there is a reasonable
relation between the end and the means. Id. As long as there is a substantial relation to
a public end, such as public health, safety, and morals, and the means are neither op-
pressive nor arbitrary, the Court will generally uphold the state law or action. Id. at
303.
46. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. Justice Merhige dissented, criticizing the majority's disre-
gard of the Supreme Court decision in Stanley. Id. at 1203. He asserted that the court
should have invalidated the statute because Stanley extended the right of privacy to
protect state intrusions into the home. 403 F. Supp. at 1205. Justice Merhige con-
cluded that a state must show a compelling interest before regulating private, consen-
sual, sexual behavior in the privacy of an individual's home. Id.
The state courts continued to grapple with the right of privacy issue. In People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied sub
nom New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S 987 (1981), Onofre was convicted of violating a
New York Penal Law that makes it a crime to engage in consensual sodomy. Id. at 483,
415 N.E.2d at 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948. He admitted to having committed acts of
deviate sexual intercourse with a seventeen year old male at his home. Id. The Court of
Appeals of New York invalidated the state sodomy statute, which prohibited deviate
sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 949. The court applied the Griswold, Stanley, and Eisenstadt rationales and
held that the right of privacy protects individual decisions to seek deviate sexual gratifi-
cation, as long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults. Id. at 486-90, 415
N.E.2d at 939-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950-52. The court recognized the state's interest in
protecting public morality, but found that the statute in question sought to regulate
private morality, which the Constitution protects under the right of privacy. Id.
Public morality deals with the state's interest in insuring that the public as a whole
maintains a moral prospective on life. Private morality is an individual's own values
and ideals, wholly unrelated to the public's moral views. See, e.g., Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at
489-91, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952. See Katz, Sexual Morality and the
Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB. L. REV. 311, 312 (1982) (discussion of Onofre
as victory for advocates of sexual freedom).
In People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983), cert.
granted sub nom. New York v. Uplinger, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), dismissed, 467 U.S. 246
(1984), defendants challenged the constitutionality of a state sodomy statute that pro-
scribed loitering in a public place to engage or solicit another to take part in deviate
sexual intercourse. Id. at 937, 447 N.E.2d at 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The court held
that the state may not constitutionally prohibit sexual behavior conducted in private by
consenting adults. Id. at 938, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The court as-
serted that the object of the statute was to punish conduct in anticipation of the act of
consensual sodomy. Id. That object, the court found, was not within the state's police
power. Id. The court therefore held the statute invalid. Id.
47. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Considerable controversy existed over the precedential
effect of Doe. The Supreme Court's opinionless affirmance left the courts with the ques-
tion of whether the Supreme Court decided Doe on the merits, making it binding prece-
dent, or affirmed Doe because the plaintiff lacked standing. See Comment, supra note 4,
at 840. See also Hickes v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (lower courts are bound by
summary decisions of the Supreme Court until Court informs them that they are not).
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statute in Baker v. Wade,4" causing a split in the circuits.49 In Baker a
homosexual challenged the statute's constitutionality under the right of
privacy." The district court invalidated the statute and held, inter
alia, that it violated the right to privacy by intruding into the private
sex lives of fully consenting adults.5 The Fifth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that Doe was binding precedent until the Supreme Court held
otherwise.5 2
But see Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (summary affirmance supports the
judgment but not necessarily the reasoning of the lower court).
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 1841 (1986), the Court did not resolve the Doe
controversy because it wanted to give plenary consideration to the merits of the case.
Id. at 2843.
48. 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986). In Baker the
plaintiff, a homosexual, challenged the constitutionality of a Texas statute that pro-
scribed engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex. Id.
at 291.
49. Id. at 292. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (Eleventh
Circuit, in invalidating sodomy statute, exemplifies split in circuits). See supra notes 5-
14 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 292.
51. Id. at 291. The district court also held that the statute violated the right to
equal protection. Id. at 291. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the lower court's
holding on that issue. Id. at 292. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that since homosexual
conduct is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the states need only show
that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state end. Id. The court concluded
that the statute did not deprive the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws because the
state had shown a rational basis, namely implementing morality, for the statute. Id.
See generally C. COLLIN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES, 110-25
(1974) (discussion of equal protection).
52. 769 F.2d at 292. See supra note 47 (precedential effect of Supreme Court sum-
mary affirmances). Seven judges dissented, arguing that the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance in Doe was not a decision on the merits, and therefore not controlling. 769
F.2d at 293-99. One dissenting judge argued that Texas had blatantly encroached upon
the intimate sex lives of consenting adults and that the statute was therefore invalid on
its face. Id. at 293 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
The remaining seven dissenting judges argued that the appeal was improper because
neither party appealed the lower court decision. Id. at 295. (Rubin, J., dissenting). The
district attorney, however, intervened and became the defendant class representative
after the lower court had decided the case. Id. at 294. These dissenters asserted that
the district attorney had no standing to appeal the case. Id. at 295. They argued that
the court had originally given the district attorney an opportunity to join the defendant
class in the lower court, but that he had declined. Id. at 294. According to his dissent,
the district attorney was an improper party to bring the appeal because he chose not to
intervene until after the lower court judgment. Id. at 295. The dissent concluded that
the district attorney did not adequately represent the interests of the state and should
not have been permitted to appeal as the class representative. Id. at 299.
1987]
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In Bowers v. Hardwick53 the Supreme Court began its brief majority
opinion emphasizing that the case did not require a judgment of
whether laws against sodomy were wise or desirable.5 4 Justice White
outlined the issue in terms of whether the Constitution conferred a fun-
damental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. 5
Justice White argued that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously inter-
preted past right to privacy cases to justify the extension of this right to
homosexual sodomy. 6 He stated that the rights recognized in the
53. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
54. Id. at 2843. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined.
55. Id. Justice White stated that the case did not raise a question about the propri-
ety of state legislative decisions repealing laws against sodomy or of state court decisions
to invalidate sodomy laws on state constitutional grounds. Id.
56. d Justice White criticized the Eleventh Circuit for interpreting Griswold v.
Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade, which construed the due process
clause to confer a fundamental right to bear a child, to confer a right of privacy to
homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Id. Justice White also cited three cases, Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), that recognized a funda-
mental right for individuals to make their own decisions with regard to child rearing
and education. These decisions, as well as Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(fundamental right to make decisions regarding family relationships), Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental right to make deci-
sions regarding procreation), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (fundamental
right to make decisions regarding marriage), could not be interpreted to extend the right
of privacy to homosexual sodomy. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
In Hardwick v. Bowers the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Constitution prevents
states from interfering with certain personal decisions because such decisions are private
and should be free from governmental intrusion. 760 F.2d at 1211. The court set forth
a list of protected rights, including decisions regarding marriage, childbearing, and fam-
ily life, and classified them as fundamental rights. Id. The court then determined that
Hardwick's activity could be added to the list of fundamental rights, invalidating the
Georgia sodomy statute. 760 F.2d at 1211.
The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's recent expansion of
rights protected by the right of privacy. See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
The court broadly read Griswold to assert that individuals have the right to make cer-
tain decisions involving personal and intimate matters. 760 F.2d at 1211. It combined
the holding in Eisenstadt with the holding in Stanley to extend to unmarried individuals
the protection of privacy in the home. Id. at 1212. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
Hardwick's situation was similar to those in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Stanley because
he was an unmarried individual who desired to engage in sexual activity in the privacy
of his home. This activity, the court stated, was of a highly personal nature and should
therefore be constitutionally protected as a fundamental right. Id. See supra notes 33-
36 and accompanying text (discussion of Roe v. Wade). The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that the sodomy statute abridged Hardwick's fundamental right and held that
the statute was void unless the state could withstand the strict scrutiny of the compel-
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right to privacy cases, particularly those involving marriage, family,
and procreation, did not bear any resemblance to the constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
5 7
Justice White then quoted two definitions of "protected rights" from
two prior Supreme Court cases. 58 In these two cases, the Court defined
"protected rights" as "fundamental liberties that implied in the con-
cept of ordered liberty"59 and "those liberties that are deeply rooted in
the nation's history and tradition."'  According to the majority,
neither of these definitions confer a fundamental right upon homosexu-
als to engage in sodomy.6 The Court reasoned that laws criminalizing
sodomy have roots in the common law.62 In light of this fact, Justice
White concluded that the right to engage in sodomy is not grounded in
the nation's history, and therefore does not fall under the definition of a
"protected right."63
Justice White further reasoned that the Supreme Court should be
reluctant to make an addition to the list of protected activities included
in the category of fundamental rights.' 4 He feared that if the Court
extended this category, the judiciary would be governing the country
without express constitutional authority.65 The Court, therefore, re-
fused to recognize a new fundamental right for homosexual sodomy.
66
The majority then addressed Hardwick's argument that Stanley v.
Georgia6 7 protected his conduct in the privacy of his home.68 Justice
ling interest test. 760 F.2d at 1213. See supra notes 1 (discussion of compelling interest
test), 9 (discussion of the standing issue).
57. Id. at 2844.
58. Id.
59. Id. This definition was set forth in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326
(1937).
60. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. This definition was set forth in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
61. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
62. Id. The majority also recognized that sodomy was illegal in the thirteen original
states, and that when the fourteenth amendment was ratified, 32 of the 37 states in the
Union criminalized sodomy. Id. at 2844-45. Today, the Court stated, 24 states and the
District of Columbia criminalized sodomy between consenting adults. Id. at 2845.
63. Id. at 2846.
64. Id. Justice White stated that the Supreme Court comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it makes decisions and laws without explicit constitutional authority. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussion of Stanley).
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White distinguished Stanley on the grounds that it was a first amend-
ment case and Hardwick's claim was based on the fourteenth amend-
ment.69 Justice White further asserted that not all activities that occur
in the home today, such as possession of drugs, firearms, or stolen
goods, are without criminal consequences.70 According to the major-
ity, to permit consenting adults to engage in sodomy would invite ques-
tions regarding the right to engage in incest, adultery, and other sex
crimes committed in the privacy of the home.71 The Court refused to
do this and concluded that the right to privacy does not include the
right to engage in sodomy.72
Justice Blackmun wrote a strong dissent, asserting that the issue in
this case was not whether the Constitution conferred a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy but, rather, whether civilized
man has the right to be let alone.7 3 He criticized the majority's conclu-
sion that the Georgia sodomy statute is valid because the laws of many
states have criminalized this conduct and still do so today.74 He ar-
gued that upholding a law because it has been the law since ancient
times is "revolting."75 Justice Blackmun stated that Hardwick's claim
should be analyzed in light of the values that underlie the constitu-
68. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. Hardwick relied on Stanley to argue that the Constitution
protects homosexual conduct if it occurs in the privacy of the home. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Justice White recognized that some victimless crimes that occur in the pri-
vacy of the home are criminal notwithstanding Stanley. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing his
view that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right to commit homosexual
sodomy. Id. at 2847 (Burger, CJ., concurring). The Chief Justice cited old codes and
rules of common law to assert that if the Court held that the Constitution protects
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right, these moral teachings would be completely
cast aside. Id. He concluded that the Constitution does not deprive a state of the power
to enact sodomy statutes. Id.
Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
He asserted that the eighth amendment may protect Hardwick since the Georgia sod-
omy statute sets the punishment for its violation at imprisonment for up to 20 years. Id.
Justice Powell argued that this prison sentence is very long and would create a serious
eighth amendment issue. Id. He concluded that because no state court had tried or
convicted Hardwick, the issue was not before the Court. Id. at 2848.
73. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion
in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
74. Id.
75. Id. Justice Blackmun further stated that it is also revolting for a rule to persist
from blind imitation of the past when the grounds for the law no longer exist. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/18
SODOMY STATUTES
tional right to privacy.7 6 The dissent began its analysis by accusing the
majority of focusing solely on a homosexual's right to engage in sod-
omy though the Georgia statute does not differentiate according to
gender.77 The dissent also criticized the majority on procedural
grounds, arguing that the majority should have considered whether the
statute violated the eighth or ninth amendments, or the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.78 According to Justice
Blackmun the Court had a duty to examine each complaint under all
possible theories even though Hardwick did not advance those
theories.7 9
Justice Blackmun accused the majority of ignoring the basic reasons
why the Constitution protects certain rights associated with the fam-
ily.8 o According to the dissent, the Constitution protects these rights
because they form a central part of an individual's life, greatly contrib-
ute to the happiness of individuals, and promote harmony.8 1 Justice
Blackmun argued that, in essence, the majority refused to recognize the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of
their intimate associations with others.82 Justice Blackmun concluded
that to deprive individuals of the right to choose how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to values most deeply
rooted in our nation's history than tolerance of non-conformity could
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2849. See supra note 6 (Georgia sodomy statute).
78. 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2851. Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority ignored the warning in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977), that the Court should not
ignore the basic reasons why the fourteenth amendment due process clause protects
certain rights associated with the family. Id.
81. Id. Justice Blackmun stated that the Constitution protects decisions about mar-
riage because marriage is an association that promotes life. Id. The Constitution pro-
tects decisions regarding parenthood because it dramatically alters an individual's self-
definition. Id. Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that the Constitution protects the fam-
ily because it contributes to the happiness of individuals. Id.
82. Id. at 2852-53. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's interpretation of
Stanley Y. Georgia. Id. He asserted that the Stanley Court based its decision on the
fourth amendment's protection of the individual in the home. Id. at 2853. Justice
Blackmun found no justification for the majority's comparison of private consensual
activity with the possession of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods in the home. Id. He
stated that drugs and weapons are dangerous and that stolen property is wrongfully
taken, concluding that the Georgia sodomy statute does not prohibit any activity that is
physically dangerous to anyone. Id.
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ever do.
83
Bowers v. Hardwick is a significant decision because it ends the con-
fusion that has surrounded the right of privacy of homosexuals.14 The
majority, however, decided the case improperly because it addressed
the incorrect issue. The majority framed the issue in terms of whether
the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy." The Court should have decided whether intimate
sexual activities between consenting adults are so private as to be be-
yond the reach of the states' control. The majority's focus was incor-
rect because the Georgia sodomy statute does not differentiate between
homosexuals and heterosexuals.86 The statute makes it a crime for any
person to engage in sodomy. The Court, therefore, did not address the
proper issue.
The majority mistakenly assumed that by affirming the Eleventh Cir-
cuit decision, it would have decided that homosexual sodomy was wise
or desirable. Further, the Court assumed that it would have to decide
that homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 7
The majority need only have included one more intimate activity under
the scope of the already broad definition of the fundamental right to
privacy, as recognized and expanded in a long line of Supreme Court
cases.
88
The majority's decision will not simply affect homosexuals. 89 The
83. Id. at 2856.
84. See supra notes 40-52 (cases that exemplify the confusion surrounding this
issue).
85. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
86. See supra note 8 (Georgia sodomy statute).
87. The majority need only have found that the act of sodomy between any con-
senting adults is included in the right of people to control private activities in their
homes.
88. See supra notes 16-39 and accompanying text (discussion of cases that recognize
a right to privacy).
89. Homosexuals maintain that the mere existence of sodomy statutes has a signifi-
cant and lasting impact upon them. R. HOOK, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRI-
VACY: SODOMY LAWS 2 (1981). Homosexuals assert that sodomy statutes repress their
sexual identity by inhibiting persons inclined toward obtaining sexual satisfaction by
sodomy from fulfilling their sexual desires. Id. Sodomy statutes also affect homosexu-
als by encouraging a form of blackmail whereby states can threaten homosexuals with
prosecution or exposure. Id. at 3. Employers may be reluctant to hire homosexuals
because of their vulnerability to blackmail. Id. Finally, sodomy statutes indirectly ap-
prove the existing discrimination against homosexuals in public housing and employ-
ment. Id. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4, at 5, col. 1 (late city ed.).
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Court's holding upholds state sodomy statutes that include both homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals. Seventy-five to ninety percent of all sexually
active adults engage in sodomous activity."0
Bowers constitutes a major setback for all adults who want to make
their own decisions as to the intimate activities they engage in with
their spouses or companions. States should not be able to enter private
homes and regulate intimate activity. By permitting states to do so,91
Bowers represents a dangerous and improper intrusion into the most
private and personal activity of adults who are fully capable of making
their own intelligent and rational sexual decisions.
Angelina Marie Massari
90. See generally W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, MASTERS & JOHN-
SON ON SEX AND HUMAN LOVING (1986).
91, The states have advanced the following interests in upholding sodomy statutes:
1. to prevent veneral disease,
2. to maintain marital stability,
3. to protect the moral welfare of their citizens,
4. to discourage sexual promiscuity,
5. to prevent anti-social behavior, and
6. to maintain and increase the population.
Id. But see BARNETT, supra note 1, at 2 (in the near future states' interests may include
population control).
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